How to Make Guest Worker Visas Work by Alex Nowrasteh
Executive Summary
President Obama and a bipartisan group of 
eight senators have begun to push for immigra-
tion reform. Speaker of the House John Boehner 
(R-OH) likewise said he supports an immigra-
tion overhaul as a “top priority” for 2013. The 
Texas Republican Party even called for an ex-
panded and effective guest worker visa program 
to link American employers with skilled and 
low-skilled foreign workers. 
The three components of politically feasible 
immigration reform are legalization for some 
unauthorized immigrants, border and work-
place enforcement to impede the entry and hir-
ing of unauthorized immigrants, and increased 
numbers of guest workers and legal immigrants. 
The costs and benefits of legalization, security, 
and employee verification have been debated 
elsewhere in detail but the costs and benefits of 
guest worker visas and how to create them have 
not been similarly explored. 
An expanded and lightly regulated guest work-
er visa program is an essential part of any immigra-
tion reform proposal. A guest worker visa program 
should efficiently link foreign workers with Amer-
ican employers and function with a minimum of 
government interference. Market forces as well as 
security, criminal, and health concerns should be 
the factors that determine which workers acquire 
visas. A successful guest worker visa would also 
divert most unauthorized immigration into the 
legal system, shrink the informal economy, be 
easily enforceable, support economic growth in 
the United States, and narrow the government’s 
role in immigration. Below are numerous sugges-
tions that would achieve such reform and expand 
America’s current guest worker visa programs.
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History of Guest  
Worker Visas
Guest worker programs are not a recent 
policy development. The ancient Greek city-
state of Athens had a similar program where 
workers were called metics and had to pay a 
special tax called a metoikion.1 Metics were not 
allowed to own real estate or participate in pol-
itics but they could work, amass wealth, and 
be productive members of the Athenian econ-
omy.2 Aristotle and Cephalus, whose mansion 
Socrates visits at the beginning of the Republic, 
are two of the most famous metics.3
During the Middle Ages and Renaissance 
foreign skilled workers were often allowed to 
live and work in designated neighborhoods 
in major European cities. Foreigners living 
in these zones had certain legal protections, 
could rent or own property, and lived with 
fewer rights and responsibilities than other 
subjects and citizens. For example, King Ed-
ward I of England granted a zone in London 
to Italian goldsmiths as part of his merchant 
law reforms so they could live, own property, 
and ply their trade in the city.4 The area even-
tually became known as Lombard Street, 
named after the area of Italy where the gold-
smiths originated, and it attracted other fi-
nancial institutions and insurance compa-
nies into the present day. 
In the 18th century the British Empire re-
vived a special legal designation called a “deni-
zen” to allow immigrants to own property be-
fore becoming citizens. Denization was vital 
during the British settlement of North Amer-
ica because the 18th century British common 
law allowed only British citizens to own real 
estate. To attract settlers to the American 
colonies from different nations, the British 
created the legal category of denizens to allow 
immigrants to own property before becom-
ing citizens.5 Denizen rights were limited, but 
they only lasted one generation. Birthright 
citizenship extended to all born of free parent-
age in the British Empire, so the children of 
denizens were born as British citizens.6 
From American independence until 1882, 
the United States had a nearly open borders 
policy where only criminals, the ill, and peo-
ple with a high probably of harming Ameri-
cans were barred from immigrating. During 
the 19th century successive and overlapping 
waves of immigrants from Ireland, Italy, Po-
land, Russia, Germany, China, and Japan ar-
rived in the United States. Their descendants 
assimilated culturally, economically, and 
politically with little trouble. In the middle 
of the assimilative process, the 1882 Chinese 
Exclusion Act barred the immigration of 
most East Asians. Gradually, the U.S. Con-
gress restricted immigration so much that 
during the Great Depression virtually all im-
migration was illegal.7
When the United States entered World 
War I in 1917, low-skilled immigration from 
Europe halted. Coupled with the mobilization 
of millions of American men into the armed 
forces and the Immigration Act of 1917, which 
virtually ended free Mexican immigration, 
some American industries were faced with 
large manpower shortfalls.8 The Immigration 
Act of 1917 allowed the secretary of Labor to 
engage in contract labor with temporary guest 
workers in limited conditions, like the emer-
gency caused by World War I.9 The program 
lasted from 1917 to 1921 and brought in 
80,000 Mexicans, along with small numbers of 
Bahamians and Canadians, to work farming 
sugar beets, cotton fields, and as railway work-
ers.10 Under pressure from Samuel Gompers’ 
American Federation of Labor, a small num-
ber of migrants who worked in railways were 
removed at the end of the war while the rest of 
the program was terminated in 1921.11
The labor demands of World War II 
prompted the U.S. government to create a 
modern guest worker visa through the Emer-
gency Farm Labor Supply Program in 1942, 
popularly known as the Bracero Program.12 
The program set out rules for the temporary 
employment of Mexican farm workers by 
U.S. farmers who employed them so long as 
they did not displace American workers. 
The government regulated the wages, du-
ration of employment, age of workers, mi-
grant health care, and transportation from 
Mexico to U.S. farms.13 Transportation to 
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the farm, housing, and meals were sold by the 
employers for a low price.14 Importantly, the 
Bracero Program did not limit the number 
of migratory workers as long as the govern-
ment’s conditions were met, making the sys-
tem relatively flexible. Increased lawful mi-
gration, flexibility, and smart enforcement 
funneled workers into the Bracero Program 
and reduced unauthorized immigration by 
an estimated 90 percent.15 
From its humble beginnings in September, 
1942, when the first group of 500 Braceros ar-
rived at a farm outside of Stockton, Califor-
nia, until the program’s cancellation in 1964, 
nearly five million Mexicans worked legally in 
the United States.16 From 1955 to 1960, an-
nual Bracero migration fluctuated between 
400,000 and 450,000.17 By the time of its can-
cellation, increasing regulations and restric-
tions whittled their numbers down to just 
168,000.18 Those regulations raised costs for 
farmers and migrants, incentivizing migrants 
to move into the informal, underground 
economy.19 By making lawful employment 
of migrants so expensive, the government cre-
ated unauthorized immigration.
Pressure from unions, especially Cesar 
Chavez’s United Farm Workers (UFW), per-
suaded Congress to cancel the Bracero Pro-
gram in 1964.20 The great grape strike of 
1965, which was the UFW’s first major suc-
cess, was only possible after Congress can-
celled the Bracero Program and Mexican la-
borers were denied legal work opportunities 
on American farms.21
After cancellation of the Bracero Pro-
gram, the H-2 guest worker visa became the 
source of legal foreign agricultural workers. 
The H-2 was underused relative to the Bra-
cero Program because of complex rules, nu-
merical restrictions, and the cost of sponsor-
ing migratory workers.22 The H-2 visa was 
initially created through the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 for “other tem-
porary workers” not covered by the Bracero 
Program.23 From 1964 until 1986, mostly 
temporary unauthorized Mexican migration 
filled the gap left by the repeal of the Bracero 
Program and unfilled by the H-2 visa.24 
The 1986 Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act separated the H-2 visa into the H-2A 
for temporary agricultural workers and the 
H-2B for seasonal nonagricultural workers. 25 
Over time, the Department of Labor created 
even more extensive regulations for the H-2A 
visa.26 Although the H-2A visa faces no nu-
merical limit, the complexity of federal regula-
tions has made the visa too expensive for most 
farmers.27 The H-2B visa, although less com-
plex, is numerically capped.28 The Immigra-
tion Act of 1990 created what we now know 
as the H-1 visa for highly skilled workers.29 
There are other infrequently used temporary 
guest worker visas for those with extraordi-
nary abilities in the sciences, arts, education, 
business, athletics, and entertainment.30
The American guest worker system divides 
migrants into visa categories based on their 
skills and occupation. It then creates differ-
ing regulatory burdens through inspection, 
wage controls, employee benefit mandates, 
country-of-origin restrictions, worker mobil-
ity, numerical quotas, and numerous other 
limitations on the employment and number 
of guest workers. Since World War I the level 
of control and restrictiveness of quotas has 
increased, creating an environment where 
unauthorized immigration can thrive. 
Why Do They Migrate?
Migrants are drawn to economic op-
portunity in the United States. Wages for 
identical workers in the United States are on 
average 2.53 times as high as in Mexico, pro-
viding a powerful magnet for Mexican im-
migrants.31 More important for future im-
migrants, wage disparities between identical 
Asian and American workers are even great-
er.32 Workers in India, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines, three large immigrant source 
countries, can expect to see their wages in-
crease by about 6, 6.5, and 4 times, respec-
tively, by moving to the United States.33
Wages for observably identical workers 
vary so much across countries for two major 
reasons. The first is that the United States 
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has far better economic policies and institu-
tions than most of the rest of the world. Free 
markets, the rule of law, relative peace, and 
a host of other factors have created an envi-
ronment where capital, education, and other 
improvements have been allowed to multiply 
and increase worker productivity and wages. 
The second reason is that American im-
migration restrictions prevent most immi-
grants from coming to the United States. 
The wages for native born Americans would 
not decrease much from increased lawful im-
migration, but the wages for people remain-
ing in developing nations would rise tremen-
dously because of remittances and other 
transfers from migrants.34
Immigrants are able to come to the Unit-
ed States because American employers want 
to hire them. The labor force of industries at 
both the high and low ends of the market, 
from agriculture and construction to tech-
nology and engineering, would be gutted if 
migration were halted. Labor-intensive agri-
culture, for instance, would no longer exist in 
the United States without a constant stream 
of lower-skilled workers willing to work for 
wages that most Americans consider too low. 
Noneconomic factors, such as risk diversifi-
cation, the friends and relatives effect,35 lin-
guistic and historical ties,36 and others37 also 
influence immigration decisions.
Lawful permanent immigration is virtu-
ally impossible, with the exception of a few 
highly skilled workers lucky enough to find 
employer sponsors, migrants closely related 
to American citizens or legal permanent resi-
dents, winners of the limited diversity visa 
lottery, or refugees. As explained above, tem-
porary migration via guest worker visas is 
heavily restricted. The only other alternative 
for would-be lawful migrants or permanent 
immigrants is unauthorized immigration.
Migrant Flows
Migration is not a unidirectional phe-
nomenon nor does it overwhelmingly result 
in permanent settlement. During the height 
of American immigration in the early 20th 
century, return migration from the United 
States was equal to about one third of the 
inflow.38 Italian return migration as a per-
centage of inflows was about 50 percent dur-
ing that time for all countries in the Western 
hemisphere.39 Migration became more tem-
porary when the price of international travel 
fell relative to expected migrant income.40
In the late 20th century, the price of in-
ternational travel was even lower relative to 
migrant income. Low-skilled Mexican mi-
grants, for example, often made numerous 
trips back and forth between their home 
country and the United States. There were 
an estimated 26.7 million entries of unau-
thorized Mexican migrants into the United 
States from 1965 to 1985 and 21.8 million 
departures to Mexico, yielding a net increase 
of just 4.9 million over 20 years.41 For lawful 
migrants, the return rate was lower but fluc-
tuated between 20 percent and 30 percent 
in the 1970s and 1980s.42 A comprehensive 
and accessible guest worker program would 
complement the temporary nature of mod-
ern migrant flows. 
Failed Immigration Policy
The U.S. government has struggled to 
enforce its restrictive immigration policy 
ever since it was created. Mexico, the larg-
est source country for lawful and unauthor-
ized immigrants since the 1960s,43 shares 
a 2,000-mile land border with the United 
States.44 Around 11.5 million unauthorized 
immigrants are currently residing in the 
United States, and approximately 6.8 mil-
lion of them are from Mexico.45
Immigration restrictionists claim that the 
government simply needs to enforce the im-
migration laws in order to prevent unauthor-
ized immigration.46 The 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act aimed to do just 
that by ramping up workplace and internal 
enforcement regulations. This was done by 
creating employer sanctions for hiring unau-
thorized workers. For the first time in history, 
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American employers were required to check 
documentation of all prospective employees 
through the I-9 form (used by employers to 
verify employee identities and establish the 
worker’s eligibility to accept employment in 
the United States). The act authorized fines 
for firms that knowingly or intentionally 
hired unauthorized immigrants.47 The goal 
was to make employment of unauthorized 
immigrants more difficult so fewer of them 
would immigrate in the first place. 
Employer sanctions and workplace regu-
lations have steadily increased since the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act. The Il-
legal Immigrant Reform and Immigration 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 created 
tougher penalties for unauthorized work-
ers48 and a pilot program for the electronic 
employment eligibility verification system 
that became E-Verify.49 It was designed to 
complement the I-9 form and be used by 
employers to check employee identity in-
formation to exclude unauthorized immi-
grants from the workplace.50 It is currently 
mandatory for all employers in a handful of 
states and for some contractors.51 Some pol-
iticians are promoting E-Verify as a national 
program52 but its high rate of inaccuracy,53 
its cost,54 and its bureaucratic problems55 
make it ineffective at enforcing employ-
ment-related immigration laws. 
In 2009 Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) began rapidly expanding the 
number of inspections and audits of business 
owners’ I-9 records.56 ICE is able to investigate 
over 1,000 businesses at a time, many of them 
remotely.57 The amount of fines levied on 
American businesses for administrative viola-
tions of immigration laws was $10,463,988 in 
2011—almost 16 times that of 2008.58
The federal government has also roped lo-
cal and state law enforcement agencies into 
enforcing federal immigration laws. IIRIRA 
created a voluntary federal training program 
called 287(g) so local law enforcement could 
enforce immigration laws if they so chose, 
but it was ultimately unsuccessful and only 
partnered with 68 police departments at its 
peak.59 Secure Communities (SCOMM), 
created in March 2008, is a mandatory pro-
gram60 that links fingerprints from arrestees 
with government immigration and criminal 
databases. If the Department of Homeland 
Security suspects an arrestee is an unauthor-
ized immigrant, it issues a detainer notice to 
hold the arrestee and release him or her into 
ICE custody.61 In October 2008 SCOMM 
was piloted in 14 police jurisdictions62 but 
has since grown to over 3,000 in the United 
States and is largely responsible for the in-
crease in deportations since 2008.63
Immigration enforcement on the border 
was also ramped up after 1986. The size of 
the Border Patrol’s budgets, staff, and in-
frastructure expanded rapidly. From 1986 
to 2012, Border Patrol appropriations in-
creased almost eightfold in real terms.64 At 
least four laws have been passed since 1986 
authorizing specific off-budget increases in 
the size of the Border Patrol.65 The number 
of agents on the southern border increased 
more than ninefold, from 1,975 in 1980 to 
18,506 in late 2011.66
Those increases in personnel and funding 
do not include the construction of tactical 
infrastructure, which includes border secu-
rity fencing, transportation, communication 
equipment, and new technology.67 Tacti-
cal infrastructure appropriations started at 
a mere $25 million in 1996 and increased 
to over $1.5 billion in 2007 to comply with 
the Secure Fence Act of 2006 that ordered 
the construction of a roughly 700-mile long 
fence along the Southwest border.68 Con-
struction on the border fence was completed 
by early 2012.69
Those increases in personnel and infra-
structure were accompanied by numerous 
different border enforcement strategies over 
the decades. Shortly after taking office in 
1993, President Bill Clinton’s administration 
began to emphasize “prevention through de-
terrence” by focusing Border Patrol security 
assets on major entry points along the U.S.–
Mexico border.70 That strategy spawned local 
operations like Operation Blockade in 1993, 
Operations Gatekeeper and Safeguard in 
1994, and Operation Rio Grande in 1997.71 
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President George W. Bush began the Secure 
Border Initiative (SBI) in 2005 to incorporate 
more personnel, infrastructure, and techno-
logical improvements into border security.72 
Obama expanded SBI to include aerial drones 
for border surveillance.73
Since 2006 the U.S. military has played a 
supporting role in border enforcement. Over 
the course of Operation Jump Start from 
2006 to 2008, more than 30,000 National 
Guard troops were deployed along the south-
ern border because of requests for aid from 
the governors of Arizona, California, New 
Mexico, and Texas.74 Responding to a simi-
lar request in 2010, President Obama stated 
that he was sending 1,200 National Guard 
troops to the southern border as “a basic step 
in securing the border before other reforms 
are implemented through legislation.”75 
Harsher punishments like jail time, bans 
on lawful entry, and deportations deeper 
into Mexico have also escalated in recent 
years.76 Operation Streamline is a sector-spe-
cific enforcement strategy that applies those 
harsher punishments against unauthorized 
immigrants apprehended in heavily traf-
ficked areas.77 Started in the Del Rio border 
sector of Texas by the Bush administration 
in 2005, it has since expanded and is using 
vast judicial resources in prosecuting first-
time immigration offenders instead of just 
returning them to Mexico.78
Unauthorized immigration to the United 
States has diminished since 2006 mainly be-
cause of the faltering economy. Increased de-
portations because of Secure Communities 
and the voluntary return of some unauthor-
ized immigrants have stabilized their popu-
lation at around 11.5 million.79 But even 
if the land border with Mexico were totally 
secure, unauthorized immigrants would 
find other means of entry once the economy 
improved. Recent estimates indicate that be-
tween 31 percent and 57 percent of all unau-
thorized immigrants overstayed visas, mean-
ing that they entered legally but currently 
reside illegally.80 Crossing the southern land 
border without a visa is not the only means 
of unauthorized residence.
By the early 1950s many unauthorized 
migrants were entering alongside Braceros 
to work, mainly in Texas.81 The government 
responded with the now infamous Opera-
tion Wetback that removed almost 2 million 
unauthorized Mexicans in 1953 and 1954.82 
Unlike today’s removals and deportations, 
the migrants were only required to step over 
the border into Mexico and could then step 
back in and lawfully sign up for the Bracero 
program.83 As a result, the number of remov-
als in 1955 was barely 3 percent of the pre-
vious year’s numbers and those who previ-
ously would have entered unlawfully instead 
signed up to become Braceros, which was the 
intended purpose of Operate Wetback.84 The 
government did not tolerate unlawful entry 
but made it very easy for migrants to get a 
guest worker visa and used Border Patrol to 
funnel unauthorized migrants and potential 
unauthorized migrants into the legal system. 
A real and long-term solution to unau-
thorized immigration requires less law en-
forcement but instead provides a legal, cheap, 
and open guest worker visa for foreign work-
ers to temporarily work in the United States. 
The informal economy will only recede when 
a legal option for temporary employment is 
open for the vast majority of would-be unau-
thorized immigrants. These immigrants will 
then finally be able to join a larger, wealthier, 
and more transparent legal market. 
Components of Successful 
Guest Worker Visas and  
Reform Options
A successful guest worker visa program 
must do several things. It must be flexible and 
large enough to supply American firms with 
the laborers they demand, so as to virtually 
eliminate unauthorized immigration. It must 
provide a legal temporary migration alterna-
tive for lower-skilled migrants, and, realisti-
cally, it must also contain some protectionist 
measures to satisfy political constituencies 
that are skeptical of the benefits of guest 
7Instead of 
Congress or 
a committee 
changing the 
quota every 
year in a vain 
attempt to guess 
how many visas 
employers will 
demand, the 
market should 
determine the 
number.
workers. Analyzed below are key components 
of successful guest worker visas that should be 
incorporated into any immigration reform. 
Numerical Quotas
The H-2 visa for temporary agricultural 
workers has no quota85 but only 2 percent of 
the agricultural workforce uses that visa be-
cause inspections, fees, paperwork, employer 
job search requirements, and minimum wag-
es make it too expensive for most farmers.86 
The more flexible and affordable H-2B visa 
for seasonal nonagricultural workers has an 
annual quota of 66,000.87 For private firms, 
H-1B visas for highly skilled workers are an-
nually limited to 85,000,88 of which 65,00089 
must come from abroad, while 20,000 are 
for foreign nationals who graduate with ad-
vanced degrees from American universities.90 
This low H-1B visa cap has been reached 
every year of its existence. In 2008 it was 
reached within one day of the start of the 
visa application process.91 During poor eco-
nomic times, the visa cap can take months to 
fill, but it does do so without fail. From 2001 
to 2003 the cap was increased to 195,000 an-
nually and did not fill during those years.92 
This is in stark contrast to the highly success-
ful World War I guest worker and Bracero 
programs, which did not put a government 
quota on the number of applications.93 As a 
result, U.S. farmers could expand and con-
tract their employment of guest workers on 
the basis of market conditions.
Instead of Congress or a committee changing 
the quota every year in a vain attempt to guess 
how many visas employers will demand, the 
market should determine the number. The gov-
ernment should not limit the number of guest 
worker visas it issues. An uncapped system allows 
the number of visas to expand and contract on 
the basis of  ebbs and flows of the market. Guest 
workers should be limited by market demand, 
which is far more binding and realistic than any 
numerical limitation.
Duration of Visa
Guest worker visas are designed to be tem-
porary. Immigration authorities do not want 
most guest workers to become lawful perma-
nent residents. Seasonal or short-term jobs 
only require temporary migration to satisfy 
demand. For instance, many farm workers 
are in demand for harvest and plantings, but 
fewer are demanded between. For other sec-
tors, visas like the H-1B are used temporarily 
to supply skilled workers for firm expansion 
or to fill skill gaps before enough Americans 
can be educated.94 According to the federal 
government, migrants are supposed to per-
form a temporary, specific, and pre-approved 
job and then depart.  
A new guest worker visa could limit the 
length of migrants’ employment in the 
United States without imposing undue costs 
on employers or migrants. Reforming rigid 
start and end times for visas is a good place 
to begin. Workers and businesses should be 
able to apply for visas long before they enter 
the country. The visa’s time limit should not 
begin to count until the worker crosses the 
border. Dates for guest worker visas should 
have flexible end times. 
Rigid start and end times can cause seri-
ous economic harm and headaches for busi-
nesses. The H-2A visa has rigid start and end 
times, but Mother Nature does not obey the 
dictates of bureaucrats and lawmakers.95 
Harvests that run late or planting seasons 
that must begin early end up producing bu-
reaucratic headaches and economic losses.96 
The drought of 2012 prompted an early har-
vest for Midwest grain and corn, but luckily 
those crops are machine harvested so bu-
reaucratic delays did not cause much dam-
age.97 Flexibility in start and end times could 
prevent a similar early harvest from affecting 
crops harvested by hand.
The second area to reform is the dura-
tion of the guest worker visa. For example, 
the H-1B visa runs for three years and can be 
renewed once for a total of six years. Many 
new H-1B visa workers are hired to replace 
those that had to leave after their H-1B visas 
ended, so new reforms that would extend the 
duration of work visas and reduce turnover 
would effectively increases the number of 
visas available. The current H-1B, H-2A, and 
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H-2B visas can also be temporarily extended, 
but the process is difficult and subject to 
burdensome constraints.98 Firms should be 
able to easily extend the duration of the visa 
by paying a fee.
These extensions make good economic 
sense. Migrants accumulate firm- and coun-
try-specific knowledge as they work and so 
become more productive over time. American 
firms should be able to harness some of that 
productivity. Making the length of the visa 
variable and extendable, within limits, allows 
Americans and migrants to capture some of 
the benefit of migrants’ American-acquired 
skills. Many firms employing guest workers 
have to hire other guest workers to replace 
them when their visas run out. Lengthening 
the time period for visas would relieve firms of 
the burden of replacing present guest workers 
with other guest workers, thus diminishing 
turnover and favoring more assimilated and 
experienced guest workers. 
Measures that seek to ensure workers re-
turn to their home countries should also be 
reformed. Three mechanisms have been pro-
posed to deal with this aspect. The first is 
requiring the migrant to pay a bond to the 
U.S. government upon entry, which he will 
receive back when he exits. If the migrant fails 
to leave by the end of his visa term (or a rea-
sonable amount of time afterward) then his 
bond is forfeited. The second proposed mea-
sure is making employers of migrant work-
ers liable for guaranteeing that their migrant 
employees return. Current employers of H-2A 
migrants, for instance, must pay for the trans-
portation of migrants between their home 
countries and farms. The third option is to 
deduct a portion of the migrant’s income into 
an interest bearing account that he will receive 
upon exit. This third method was used with 
some success during World War I.99
It is impractical to use immigration en-
forcement authorities to monitor the exit of 
every guest worker. Monetary incentives to 
encourage exit will be the most successful at 
deterring a guest worker from absconding 
and entering the informal economy at any 
point while he holds his guest worker visa. A 
small up-front bond paid by the worker com-
bined with a deduction from the migrant’s 
pay, both placed into an interest bearing ac-
count that is inaccessible to the migrant dur-
ing his time working, and which he forfeits if 
he absconds into the informal labor market, 
would provide an excellent deterrent to violat-
ing the visa restrictions. The deduction would 
have to be large enough to discourage illegally 
entering the labor market but small enough 
so that his take-home pay is noticeably greater 
than it would be in his home country. Both 
the bond and deduction might be necessary 
to ensure widespread migrant compliance so 
workers do not abscond early in their employ-
ment, before they have accrued sufficient de-
ducted wages to disincentivize absconding.
A government guarantee that guest work-
ers can return to the United States each and 
every season as long as they obey the laws 
and leave at the end of their term would also 
incentivize obedience to the guest worker vi-
sa’s rules. Combining that requirement with 
bonds and wage deductions would make it 
firmer. From 1965 to 1985, return Mexican 
migrations were frequent because the border 
was relatively unguarded. Migrants could 
work in the United States for short lengths of 
time and return home to their families secure 
in the knowledge that they could return in 
the future if the Mexican economy worsened. 
Family and permanent migration picked up 
after 1986 because increased border security, 
implemented by IRCA, made repeated cross 
border movement more difficult.100
If the punishment for absconding from a 
guest worker visa is the forfeiture of a bond, 
accumulated deductions from the worker’s 
pay, and the ability to reenter the United States 
with a visa, then informal economy wages 
would have to be high to entice unauthorized 
immigrants to incur such penalties. Unauthor-
ized immigrants currently convince American 
employers to hire them, and thus incur legal 
risks, by offering below market wages for their 
services. In such a system as outlined above, 
migrants would not have an incentive to work 
in an informal economy when they have the 
option to work in the legal economy.101
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Native Wage and Employment Protection
Complaints that immigrants lower Amer-
ican wages and “take American jobs” have 
dominated the chorus of opposition to im-
migration since the 19th century. From 
Francis A. Walker,102 the inaugural president 
of the American Economic Association, to 
Kansas secretary of state Kris Kobach,103 
protecting American wages and employment 
options has been at the center of immigra-
tion and guest worker visa debates. Con-
sequently, much of the regulation of guest 
worker visas has been motivated by concern 
for keeping American wages unaffected and 
jobs available for Americans before migrants 
can fill them. Yet this is wholly unnecessary.
The World War I guest worker program 
required employers to “pay the current rates 
of wages for similar labor in the community 
in which the admitted aliens are to be em-
ployed.”104 The Bracero Program required 
similar wage rates that were initially negoti-
ated between the Mexican and U.S. govern-
ments, to the criticism that the American 
government was practicing “socialistic” poli-
cies by setting prices.105 Eventually the wage 
controls required the payment of the “pre-
vailing wages in the area” in an attempt to 
prevent the fall of native wages.106
The current process of certifying that 
guest workers are not affecting the labor 
market outcome of natives is complex and 
bureaucratic. The Labor Condition Appli-
cation (LCA) or prevailing wage determina-
tion must be filed by employers seeking to 
hire guest workers through the H-1B and 
H-2B107 visas, respectively.108 For the H-1B 
visa,109 the LCA forces the firm to attest 
that it is paying at least the prevailing wage 
level in the area of employment, or the ac-
tual wage level at the place of employment, 
whichever is greater, and that the job, salary, 
time length, and geographic location of em-
ployment do not adversely affect Americans 
employed in that industry.110
Until recently, firms could file a single 
LCA for all of their hires, but new regula-
tions are going to limit each LCA to just 10 
H-1B petitions.111 The updated regulations 
require even more information about the 
applicants, such as previous immigration 
application reference numbers, to more ac-
curately monitor H-1B wages.112 But it is 
unnecessary to monitor wages because firms 
petition for H-1Bs when they are expanding 
and there is increased quantity demanded 
for workers across the sector,113 not when 
they are seeking to lower wages during a pe-
riod of economic or firm contraction,114 and 
they have to pay very high fees to obtain the 
visas (see next section). 
LCAs are fraught with problems. The first 
is determining local prevailing wages and 
actual wage levels. Those vary tremendously 
over geographical areas and result in strict 
bureaucratic rules to measure, in real time, a 
very fluid economic process.115
The second problem is the difficulty of 
matching job descriptions with the mini-
mum legislative requirements for hiring a 
guest worker.  According to Boston immi-
gration attorney Danielle Huntley, the pro-
cess “is like fitting a square peg into a round 
hole.”116 Labor markets are flexible and ever 
adapting to new conditions, while the LCA 
does not adapt so quickly. The entire LCA 
process is cumbersome, expensive, prone to 
allegations of fraud, and nonresponsive to 
changing market conditions.
That said, LCAs do not seem to have a sig-
nificant degree of fraud or error problems. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services claims 
that 13.4 percent of H-1B petitions were 
fraudulent, that is there was a willful misrep-
resentation, falsification, or omission of a ma-
terial fact.117 That rate is suspect because it in-
cludes incidents like an H-1B worker leaving 
work early one day, with his boss’ permission, 
so he could take his conference call at home. 
Because the worksite address for the worker 
was not properly recorded, he violated the 
LCA.118 Since other recent studies reported 
fraud rates at just above 0 percent, Citizenship 
and Immigration Services’ estimates of fraud 
are likely massively exaggerated.119
H-2A visas are subject to a different set 
of regulations. Instead of a complex LCA 
that must be filed by every employer, the 
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Department of Labor created a minimum 
wage system that varies by state.120 For the 
H-2A, bureaucratic complexity was replaced 
by centrally administered wage controls.
The perception is nonetheless that guest 
workers displace native workers and lower 
the wages for Americans, so a politically suc-
cessful guest worker program may have to 
address those concerns without causing un-
due harm to the economy.
If we must go this route, we could accom-
plish it by replacing current bureaucracy and 
regulations with an employer fee for hiring 
guest workers. Employers could pay an extra 
fee for each pay period for employing guest 
workers to incentivize the hiring of Ameri-
cans first. For instance, an American farmer 
who employs a guest worker would pay $50 
per paycheck. The incidence of the fee would 
likely be split between the guest worker and 
employer but it would incentivize the hiring 
of Americans first. A fee is cheaper to enforce, 
easier to monitor, and simple to comply with 
compared to complex regulations.
Fears that immigrants take jobs from na-
tives are based on what economists call the 
“lump of labor fallacy,” the notion that there is 
a fixed amount of work to be done regardless 
of other factors.121 There is not a fixed number 
of jobs available for American workers. Forcing 
immigrants out of a job will not automatically 
make it available for native-born workers, and 
just because an immigrant is employed does 
not mean that he pushed an American out of 
the labor market. Changing economic factors, 
not some kind of exogenous need, determine 
the number and types of jobs available in an 
economy. As a result, the number of jobs in 
an economy is constantly in flux. In addition 
to doing valuable work, immigrants are also a 
source of employment and production because 
they demand goods and services produced by 
natives and other immigrants.122
Fears that immigrants lower American 
wages are also vastly overblown. Immigrants 
have different skills, experiences, and compar-
ative advantages compared to natives, so they 
complement rather than compete with native 
workers.123 Because of their different skills, 
natives and immigrants both can make higher 
incomes because they are able to specialize in 
different tasks. That degree of specialization 
would be impossible without the deepening 
of the labor market created by immigration. 
If immigrants were to disappear from the la-
bor market, far from raising American wages, 
it would decrease them because Americans 
would no longer be as specialized.124
The most pessimistic expert account of im-
migrant impacts on native wages comes from 
Harvard economist George Borjas. He claims 
that immigration during the 1980s and 1990s 
has lowered the wages of American workers 
with less than a high school education by 8.9 
percent while leaving the wages of other edu-
cational groups largely unaffected.125 To put 
that in perspective, around 11.8 percent of the 
American adult workforce has less than a high 
school education.126 More recent research has 
found that native wages during the immi-
gration surge from 1990 to the mid-2000s 
increased slightly due to the large inflows of 
lower-skilled foreign workers.127 Regardless, 
the amount of wage increase or decrease for 
natives is small in either direction. Ironically, 
the group whose wages are most affected by 
newer low-skilled immigrants are previous 
immigrants because their skill sets are the 
most similar.128
Regardless of the real economic impact of 
immigration, many policymakers seem con-
vinced that immigration and guest workers 
would negatively affect the wages of natives. A 
simple and nonintrusive regulatory framework 
like that described above would placate the wor-
ries of many policymakers, if we must, and al-
low the market to accommodate guest workers 
with only small effects on native wages. 
Fees and Nonpecuniary Compensation
Fees are a complex part of any guest work-
er visa system. Fees can either be levied to 
cover the costs of administration or as pro-
tectionism. Fees for the lower-skilled H-2A 
and H-2B guest worker visas are designed to 
cover administrative costs.129
The base filing fee of $325 for the H-1B 
visa is supposed to cover administrative costs 
11
Guest workers 
should be free 
to negotiate and 
choose benefits 
instead of 
having the gov-
ernment pick 
their particular 
nonpecuniary 
forms of 
compensation 
for them.
of visa processing.130 Another $5,175 in fees 
can be levied for a fast-tracked H-1B petition 
for firms that employ many visa workers.131 
These high fees punish Indian firms who hire 
large numbers of H-1B workers in the United 
States, to protect American workers, and to 
funnel the money raised by the fees toward 
augmenting border enforcement.132 On top 
of government fees, firms typically have to 
pay $1,000 to $3,000 in legal fees for process-
ing the petitions.133 After all of those govern-
ment and legal fees there is still no guarantee 
that the worker will successfully obtain the 
visa.134 Fees are so high that for some firms, 
like Indian-based information technology and 
consulting firm Infosys, subcontracting costs 
for H-1B visas doubled to 3 percent of its rev-
enues in the first quarter of 2012.135 When the 
cost of hiring skilled workers for these firms 
increases, they hire fewer American workers 
and scale back production in other areas to 
make up for the high bureaucratic costs.
In any future guest worker program, sim-
ple visa processing fees should be separated 
from protectionist fees levied on guest worker 
visas. The costs of processing visas should be 
reduced by limiting bureaucratic oversight, 
but the cost should still be borne by the mi-
grant or the firm sponsoring the migrant, as 
they were under the Bracero Program.136
Nonpecuniary compensation for guest 
workers is a mainstay of American and foreign 
guest worker visas, especially for lower-skilled 
workers. Housing and healthcare were required 
for migrants during World War I and the Bra-
cero Program.137 Employers also had to provide 
transportation for workers during the Bracero 
Program.138 Yet Braceros were treated poorly 
while in transit and could not choose the partic-
ular routes they wanted to take, so sometimes 
spent weeks longer traveling to their worksites 
than they would have liked.139 Braceros should 
have been able to choose how to travel into 
the United States and pay for it themselves, as 
should future, similarly situated workers.
Employer requirements are similar under 
the H-2A visa. Employers must provide trans-
portation to their farms as well as to the next 
workplace after the fulfillment of the contract; 
federally inspected and adequate housing, 
meals, and/or facilities for migrants to prepare 
their own meals; and workers’ compensation 
insurance.140 Employers do not have to supply 
those nonpecuniary forms of compensation 
to guest workers on an H-2B visa.141
A reformed guest worker program would 
preferably eliminate the nonpecuniary com-
pensation requirements of any visa or at least 
limit them as much as possible. Guest work-
ers and employers are able to negotiate ben-
efits or reject them outright without govern-
ment direction or oversight. Citizen workers 
routinely negotiate with employers over pecu-
niary and nonpecuniary compensation, and 
without government interference they reach 
more rewarding outcomes for both parties. 
Guest workers should be free to negotiate and 
choose benefits instead of having the gov-
ernment pick their particular nonpecuniary 
forms of compensation for them.
Employer Sponsorship, Bureaucracy, 
and Migrant Mobility
Most guest worker programs require em-
ployer sponsorship of each visa. During the 
World War I and the Bracero programs, em-
ployers had to submit written evidence to 
the U.S. Employment Service showing there 
was insufficient local supply and then spon-
sor the individual workers.142
Modern guest worker visas make switching 
jobs difficult for migrants and a bureaucratic 
annoyance for employers. For the World War I 
program, switching jobs was relatively simple, 
as the new employer had to be authorized to 
hire the guest worker and the Immigration 
Services only had to be notified of the change 
by the new employer after the fact.143 Current 
H-1B visa employees can change employers af-
ter a transfer is filed with USCIS. If the worker 
loses his job and finds a new employer, the 
employer has to file an I-129 form with the 
government to switch employers. After the 
I-129 is approved the worker has to leave the 
United States to get the new visa.144
When guest workers are legally tied to em-
ployers, abuses can occur. In a free labor mar-
ket, employees who experience or fear abuse 
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can leave their employer and seek a job else-
where. But due to bureaucratic hurdles and 
the threat of being removed from the United 
States, some workers stay with bad bosses. 
This problem is entirely created by guest work-
er programs that restrict worker mobility. A 
portable guest worker visa solves this problem.
Abuse is not confined to firms. Some of the 
worst abuses of guest workers have occurred at 
the hands of government employees. During 
the Bracero Program, Department of Labor 
(DOL) inspectors often slapped, berated, and 
cursed at Braceros for asking questions.145 Ac-
cording to one eyewitness: “Nobody had any 
patience. Immigration, Public Health, Labor 
Department—it’s all the same. Everybody curs-
es at the Braceros and shoves them around.”146 
Violence and abuse perpetrated by government 
inspectors and bureaucrats was endemic. The 
Braceros were frequently humiliated, but as one 
observer recalled, “migrants usually just stood 
there and took the abuse–what else could they 
do–they felt pretty bad about it. I must have 
seen a lot of Braceros cry after they were talked 
to in this way.”147
Abuse by government bureaucrats has di-
minished over the years or become stealthy,148 
but the entire problem could be removed by 
contracting out, licensing, or just relying upon 
private companies to carry out inspections, 
recruitment, health checks, and other guest 
worker functions.149 Visa portability that lets 
guest workers change jobs with a minimum of 
paperwork or notice to employers as long as the 
worker notifies the government after the fact de-
prives abusive employers of employees, incentiv-
izes good behavior, and acts as an enforcement 
mechanism that punishes employers who do 
not treat employees as well as competing firms. 
Visa portability allows workers to regulate their 
own work environment or change it at will.
Conclusion
Congress will consider how to create a new 
guest worker program as part of immigration 
reform. Other analysts have spilled much ink 
on enforcement, amnesty, and legalization, so 
this policy analysis focuses on reform ideas 
for creating an effective guest worker visa.
Past guest worker visa programs like those 
used during World War I and the Bracero Pro-
gram provide examples of somewhat better-
functioning programs. They were less regulated, 
required fewer legal steps to hire guest workers, 
were more efficient, and placed a lower burden 
on migrants as well. Expanding similar updated 
guest worker programs into nonagricultural 
work and higher skill levels would provide an al-
ternative migration path for many migrants who 
would otherwise consider unlawful entry. The 
current guest worker visa system is hampered 
by expensive regulations, restrictive laws, and an 
uncaring bureaucracy that makes the system un-
workable for most American employers and mi-
grants who would like to work together. 
Specifically, Congress should incorporate 
these features into any new guest worker 
program: 
 ● Remove numerical quotas for tempo-
rary guest worker visas.
 ● Increase the duration of guest worker 
visas.
 ● Allow guest workers to switch employers 
without legal penalty. 
 ● Introduce flexible start and end times 
for visas.
 ● Remove or streamline complex bureau-
cracy regulating wages and working condi-
tions of guest workers, like the Labor Con-
dition Application, in favor of a fee-based 
approach and increased visa portability.
 ● Remove requirements for worker-pro-
vided housing, transportation, and other 
nonpecuniary benefits. Allow workers 
and employers to negotiate for benefits 
like other workers.
 ● Use bonds or reimbursements of man-
datory accumulated guest worker de-
ductions to incentivize guest workers 
to return to their home countries at the 
end of their visa.
 ● Allow the same worker to return year af-
ter year if there is demand for him. Only 
bar workers who are criminals, terrorists, 
or have serious communicable diseases.
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The mistake of the 1986 Immigration Re-
form and Control Act, which amnestied ap-
proximately 3 million unauthorized immi-
grants, was that it did not create a large and 
flexible guest worker program. As a result, 
in the 27 years since then, unauthorized im-
migrants continued to enter. Only a timely, 
cheap, and lawful way to enter and work in the 
United States will stanch unauthorized immi-
gration and grow our economy.
Notes
1. Peter Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western 
Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992): 28. 
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ian Goldin, Geoffrey Cameron, and Meera 
Balarajan, Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped 
Our World and Will Define Our Future (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011): 33. 
5. James E. Pfander and Theresa R. Wardon, “Re-
claiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early 
Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transpar-
ency,” Virginia Law Review 96, no. 2 (April 2010): 6–7. 
6. Ibid., p. 7. 
7. Ashley S. Timmer and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 
“Racism, Xenophobia or Markets? The Political 
Economy of Immigration Policy Prior to the Thirties,” 
NBER Working Paper no. 5867, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 1996, pp. 
xxvii–xxxi. 
8. Joyce Vialet, Barbara McClure, and Marsha 
Cerny, “Temporary Worker Programs: Background 
and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, Feb-
ruary 1980, pp. 6–7. 
9. Ibid., pp. 7–8. 
10. Otey M. Scruggs, “The First Mexican Farm 
Labor Program,” Arizona and the West 2, no. 4 
(Winter 1960): 322. 
11. Vialet, McClure, and Cerny, p. 6. 
12. The program is named for the Spanish term 
bracero, which means “strong arm.” 
13. See Wayne D. Rasmussen, The Emergency Farm 
Labor Supply Program 1943–47, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
Monograph no. 13, Washington, September 1951. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Daniel Griswold, “Comprehensive Immigra-
tion Reform: What Congress and the President 
Need to Do to Make It Work,” Albany Government 
Law Review 3, no. 1 (2010): x.
16. Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan 
J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immi-
gration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2002): 35–39.
17. Ibid., p. 37.
18. Ibid., p. 41.
19. Ibid.
20. Daniel Griswold, “Comprehensive Immigra-
tion Reform,” p. x.
21. See David Bacon, “Fast Track to the Past: Is a 
New Bracero Program in Our Future? (and what 
was life like under the old one),” David Bacon Blog, 
August 8, 2002, http://dbacon.igc.org/Imgrants/ 
17FastPast.htm.  
22. Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp. 43–47.
23. See Lindsay M. Pickral, “Close to Crucial: 
The H-2B Visa Program Must Evolve, but Must 
Endure,” University of Richmond Law Review 42, no. 4 
(March 2008). 
24. See Douglas S. Massey and Audrey Singer, 
“New Estimates of Undocumented Mexican 
Migration and the Probability of Apprehensions,” 
Demography 32 (1995): 203–13.
25. Pickral. 
26. Ibid. 
27. See Georgia Department of Agriculture, “Re-
port on Agriculture Labor as Required by House 
Bill 87,” January 2012, pp.100–117, http://agr.
georgia.gov/AgLaborReport.pdf. 
28. 8 USC § 1184(g)(1)(B).
29. David Weissbrodt and Laura Danielson, Im-
migration Law and Procedure: In a Nutshell, 5th ed., 
(Eagan, MN: Thomson West), p. 159.
30. U.S. Department of State, “Types of Visas for 
Temporary Visitors,” http://travel.state.gov/visa/
temp/types/types_1286.html. 
31. Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, 
14
and Lant Pritchett, “The Place Premium: Wage 
Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. 
Border,” Center for Global Development, Working 
Paper no. 148, July 2008, p. 11, http://www.cgdev.
org/files/16352_file_CMP_place_premium_148.
pdf. 
32. See “The Rise of Asian Americans,” Pew Social 
and Demographic Trends, July 12, 2012, http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/06/SDT-
The-Rise-of-Asian-Americans-Full-Report.pdf. 
33. Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett, p. 11.
34. See Michael A. Clemens, “Economics and 
Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 3 (2011). 
35. David J. McKenzie, “Beyond Remittances: The 
Effects of Migration on Mexican Households,” 
in International Migration, Remittances, and the 
Brain Drain, ed. Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schiff 
(Washington: The International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, World Bank, 2006): 
p. 124, http://www.ime.gob.mx/2006/estudios/
migracion/inter_migration_remittances.pdf# 
page=139. See Reino Kero, “Migration Traditions 
from Finland to North America,” in A Century 
of European Migrations, 1830–1930, ed. R. J. Vecoli 
and S. M. Sinke (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1991): 111–33. 
36. See Jennifer Hunt, “The Impact of the 1962 
Repatriates from Algeria on the French Labor Mar-
ket,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45 (1992). 
37. See Jacob Mincer, “Family Migration Deci-
sions,” The Journal of Political Economy 86, no. 5 
(October 1978). 
38. Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 
Global Migration and the World Economy: Two Centuries 
of Policy and Performance (Cambridge, MA: Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology Press, 2005): 79–80.
39. Ibid., p. 80.
40. Ibid.
41. See Massey and Singer, pp. 203–13; and 
Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp. 63–64.
42. Ibid.
43. “2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics,” 
Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of 
Homeland Security, August 2011, pp. 8–10. 
44. Dan Griswold, “Willing Workers: Fixing 
the Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration to the 
United States,” Cato Institute Trade Policy Analy-
sis no. 19, October 15, 2002, p. 4. 
45. Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan 
Baker, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immi-
grant Population Residing in the United States: 
January 2011,” Population Estimates, Office of 
Immigration Statistics, Department of Home-
land Security, March 2012, p. 5. 
46. See Mark Krikorian, “Time for Another 
DREAM Act Story,” National Review Online Blog, 
June 11, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/302379/time-another-dream-act-story-
mark-krikorian; and “Is the Enforcement of Exist-
ing Immigration Laws Alone a Good Solution to 
Illegal Immigration in America?” Procon.org blog 
post, http://immigration.procon.org/view.answers. 
php?questionID=001297. 
47. Dan Griswold, “Willing Workers,” p. 4. 
48. Ibid., p. 5. 
49. “History and Milestone of the E-Verify Pro-
gram,” U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.
eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid
=84979589cdb76210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aR
CRD&vgnextchannel=84979589cdb76210VgnVC
M100000b92ca60aRCRD. 
50. Public Law 104-208, U.S. Statutes at Large 110 
(1996): 309.
51. Alex Nowrasteh, “Alabama Fools’ Day,” Huff-
ington Post Latino Voices, April 2, 2012, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/alex-nowrasteh/alabama-
fools-day_b_1394120.html. 
52. Alex Nowrasteh, “E-Verify E-Viscerates La-
bor Market,” Huffington Post, September 23, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alex-nowrasteh/
everify-eviscerates-labor_b_976197.html. 
53. Westat Research Corporation, “Findings of the E-
Verify Program: Evaluation,” December 2009, p. xxx, 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/ 
Final%20E-Verify%20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf.
54. Jason Arveio, “‘Free’ E-Verify May Cost Small 
Business $2.6 Billion: Insight,” Bloomberg Govern-
ment, January 27, 2011.
55. Government Accountability Office, “Em-
ployment Verification: Federal Agencies Have 
Taken Steps to Improve E-Verify, but Significant 
Challenges Remain,” GAO-11-146, December 
2010, pp. 12, 34, 38–39, http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d11146.pdf.
56. Andorra Bruno, “Immigration-Related Work-
site Enforcement: Performance Measures,” Con-
gressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, pp. 2–4, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R40002.pdf. 
15
57. Alex Nowrasteh, “Is Obama Pro-Immigra-
tion?” The Daily Caller, March 28, 2011, http://cei.
org/op-eds-articles/obama-pro-immigration. 
58. Ibid., p. 6.
59. “Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration 
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Na-
tionality Act,” http://www.ice.gov/news/library/
factsheets/287g.htm.
60. Adam Klasfeld, “ICE Changed Its Tune on 
‘Secure Communities,’” Courthouse News Ser-
vice, August 9, 2011, http://www.courthousenews.
com/2011/08/09/38859.htm. 
61. “Secure Communities,” Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/secure_ 
communities/. 
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Marc R. Rosenblum, “Border Security: Immigra-
tion Enforcement between Ports of Entry,” Congres-
sional Research Service, January 6, 2012, p. 12, http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/180681.pdf. 
65. Ibid., p 14.
66. Ibid., pp 14–15. 
67. Ibid., p 13.
68. Ibid., p 17.
69. “Southwest Border Fence Construction Prog-
ress,” Customs and Border Protection, http://www.
cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/ti/ti_news/sbi_
fence/. 
70. Dan Griswold, “Willing Workers,” p. 4. 
71. Peter Andreas, “The Escalation of U.S. Immi-
gration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era,” Political 
Science Quarterly 113, no. 4 (Winter 1998–99): 596. 
72. See Rosenblum.
73. Ruth Ellen Wasem, “Nonimmigrant Over-
stays: Brief Synthesis of the Issue,” Congressional 
Research Service, January 15, 2010, p. 7, http://www.
ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2010,0819-crs.
pdf.
74. Michael D. Doubler, “Operation Jump Start: 
The National Guard on the Southwest Border,” 
National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs, 
Historical Services Division, October 24, 2008, p. 63, 
http://www.ng.mil/features/Border/factsheets/
NGB_JumpStart.pdf.
75. Quoted in R. Chuck Mason, “Securing Amer-
ica’s Borders: The Role of the Military,” Congres-
sional Research Service, June 15, 2010, p. 2, http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41286.pdf. 
76. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
“United States and Mexico begin Interior Repa-
triation Initiative,” News Release, October 3, 2012, 
http://alaska-native-news.com/world_news/6831 
united-states-and-mexico-begin-interior-repatriation 
initiative.html.
77. Customs and Border Protection, “Operation 
Streamline Nets 1,200-Plus Prosecutions in Ari-
zona,” News Release, July 24, 2007, http://www.
cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/ 
2007_news_releases/072007/07242007_3.xml. 
78. “Operation Streamline: Unproven Benefits 
Outweighed by Cost to Taxpayers,” National Immi-
gration Forum, September, 2012, p. 2, http://www.
immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2012/
Operation_Streamline_Costs.pdf. 
79. Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker, p. 5.
80. Wasem, “Nonimmigrant Overstays.” 
81. Deborah Cohen, Braceros: Migrant Citizens 
and Transnational Subject in the Postwar United 
States and Mexico, University of North Carolina 
Press, 2011, pp. 213–14.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 209.
84. Ibid., pp. 213–14.
85. Pickral. 
86. Tom Nassif, “Beyond Baseball’s Guest Work-
ers,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2012. 
87. 8 USC § 1184(g)(1)(B).
88. 8 USC §214.2(h)(8).
89. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
“Cap Count for H-1B, H-2B, and H-3 Workers for 
Fiscal Year 2010,” http://www.uscis.gov/h-1b_count.
90. Alex Nowrasteh, “H-1B Visas: A Case for Open 
Immigration of Highly Skilled Foreign Workers,” 
Issue Analysis, Competitive Enterprise Institute, 
October, 2010, p. 4, http://cei.org/sites/default/files/
Alex%20Nowrasteh%20-%20H1-B%20Visas.pdf/. 
91. Neil G. Ruiz and Jill H. Wilson, “The End 
of the Rat Race for H-1B Visas,” The Avenue, 
Brookings Institution, June 13, 2012, http://
www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/ 
16
2012/06/13-immigration-ruiz-wilson. 
92. Ibid.
93. Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp. 42–43.
94. Compete America statement on developing 
the American workforce, http://www.compete 
america.org/. 
95. Georgia Department of Agriculture, Appendix 1.
96. Pat Maio, “Agriculture: Farmers Scramble to 
Find Workers as Some Face Losing Crops,” North 
County Times, August 25, 2012, http://www.nc 
times.com/business/agriculture-farmers-scram 
ble-to-find-workers-as-some-face-losing/article_
c608e543-b90b-5d31-b053-4ed47ceb7882.html.
97. “Corn Harvest Gets Rolling,” United Press In-
ternational, August 28, 2012, http://www.upi.com/
Business_News/2012/08/28/Corn-harvest-gets-
rolling/UPI-58661346179627/. 
98. Andorra Bruno, “Immigration of Temporary 
Lower-Skilled Workers: Current Policy and Related 
Issues,” Congressional Research Service, March 20, 
2012, pp. 4, 8. 
99. Vialet, McClure, and Cerny, p. 10. 
100. See Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp. 62–
104.
101. Ibid., pp. 118–21.
102. Francis A. Walker, “Restriction of Immigra- 
tion,” Atlantic Monthly 77, no. 464, pp. 822–29, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 
1896/06/restriction-of-immigration/306011/. 
103. Kris Kobach, Conservative Political Action 
Conference, February 11, 2012, http://vimeo.com/ 
36671514. 
104. Vialet, McClure, and Cerny, p. 10. 
105. Ibid., p. 22. 
106. Ibid., p. 34. 
107. Andorra Bruno, “Immigration of Temporary 
Lower-Skilled Workers,” p. 3.
108. Ibid., p. 2; and Stephen H. Legomsky and 
Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refuge Law 
and Policy, 5th ed., Foundation Press, New York, 
2009, pp. 381z82.
109. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(a)
(12)(H)(i)(b), 212(n); and U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, “Characteristics of H-1B 
Specialty Occupation Workers, Fiscal Year 2011 
Annual Report to Congress, October 1, 2010–
September 30, 2011,” Department of Homeland 
Security, March 12, 2012, p. 2, http://www.us 
cis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20
Studies/H-1B/h1b-fy-11-characteristics.pdf. 
110. Legomsky and Rodriguez, pp. 373–74.
111. See Federal Register 77, no. 131 ( July 9, 2012), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-07-09/
pdf/2012-16587.pdf; and Cora-Ann V. Pestaina, 
“The H-1B Process Gets Even Harder: DOL Pro-
poses Dramatic Changes to the LCA Form,” Im-
migration Daily Blog post, July 24, 2012, http://
www.ilw.com/articles/2012,0724-pestaina. shtm.
112. Pestaina.
113. Stuart Anderson, “H-1B Visas by the Num-
bers: 2010 and Beyond,” National Foundation 
for American Policy, March 2010, p. 5, http://
www.nfap.com/pdf/1003h1b.pdf. 
114. Firms are always seeking to lower wages, but 
they are usually only able to do so during a poor 
economy when they have greater bargaining power 
relative to workers. 
115. See Margaret H. McCormick and David 
Stanton, Finding the Correct Wage for LCAs: Recent 
Developments in H-1B Practice, April 1995, Immi-
gration Briefings 12.
116. Danielle Huntley, Boston, Massachusetts, im-
migration attorney, quote via direct tweet on Oc-
tober 10, 2012, @DEHuntley, https://twitter.com/
DEHuntley/status/256122257993265153. 
117. “H-1B Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assess-
ment,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
September 2008, p. 8, http://www.aila.org/con 
tent/default.aspx?docid=26841. 
118. Ted J. Chiappari and Angelo A. Paparelli, 
“Looking for Fraud in All the Wrong Places—H-
1Bs Working from Home,” Seyfarth and Shaw LLP, 
http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/
attorneypubs/082411_article.pdf. 
119. Suzette Brooks Masters and Ted Ruthizer, “The 
H-1B Straitjacket: Why Congress Should Repeal the 
Cap on Foreign-Born Highly Skilled Workers,” 
Cato Trade Briefing Paper no. 7, March 3, 2000, 
p. 7, http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbp/tbp-007.pdf. 
120. Legomsky and Rodriguez, pp. 377–78.
121. Buttonwood, “Keep on Trucking: Why the 
Old Should Not Make Way for the Young,” The 
Economist, February 11, 2012, http://www.econo 
mist.com/node/21547263. 
17
122. Randall Filer, “The Effect of Immigrant 
Arrivals on Migratory Patterns of Native Workers,” 
in Immigration and the Workforce: Economic Con-
sequences for the United States and Source Areas, ed. 
George J. Borjas and Richard B. Freeman (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992): fn 5–6. 
123. See Giovanni Peri and Chad Sparber, “Task 
Specialization, Immigration, and Wages,” American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1, no. 3 (2009): 
15–17, 33; and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and 
Giovanni Peri, “Rethinking the Effect of Immi-
gration on Wages,” Journal of the European Economic 
Association (forthcoming), pp. 26–29, http://www.
econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gperi/Papers/OP_april_ 
2010.pdf. 
124. See Peri and Sparber; and Ethan G. Lewis, “Im-
migrant-Native Substitutability: The Role of Lan-
guage Ability,” NBER Working Paper no. 17609, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011, pp. 
15–17, 33. 
125.  See George Borjas, “The Labor Demand 
Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Im-
pact of Immigration on the Labor Market,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 118, no. 4 (October 2003).
126. U.S. Census Bureau, “American Community 
Survey 5-Year Estimates: Selected Characteristics 
of the Native and Foreign-Born Populations,” 
American Community Survey (2010), S0501.
127. See Ottaviano and Peri, http://www.econ.ucda 
vis.edu/faculty/gperi/Papers/OP_april_2010.pdf.on 
July 12, 2012; and Giovanni Peri, “Immigration, 
Labor Markets, and Productivity,” Cato Journal, 
Winter, 2012, pp. 42–43, http://www.cato.org/pubs/
journal/cj32n1/cj32n1-4.pdf.  
128. Ottaviano and Peri, pp. 26–29.
129. U.S. Immigration and Citezenship Services, 
H2-A Temporary Agricultural Workers, http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.
eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid
=889f0b89284a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRC
RD&vgnextchannel=889f0b89284a3210VgnVCM
100000b92ca60aRCRD.
130. H-1B Fiscal Year Cap Season, http://www.
uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95 
919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=4b7cdd
1d5fd37210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&v
gnextchannel=73566811264a3210VgnVCM1000
00b92ca60aRCRD. 
131. Ibid.
132. See Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta, 
“The World According to Senator Schumer: If 
It’s Not a Chop Shop, It’s a Body Shop,” Insightful 
Immigration Blog, Cyrus D. Mehta & Associates, 
PLLC, August 15, 2010, http://blog.cyrusmehta. 
com/2010/08/world-according-to-senator-
schumer-if.html.
133. “H1B Visa Filing Fees and Costs,” http://www.
h1base.com/visa/work/H1B%20Visa%20Fees/
ref/1186/.
134. Matt Chandler, “U.S. Quotas Hinder Em-
ployment Visas,” Buffalo Law Journal, October 11, 
2012, http://www.lawjournalbuffalo.com/news/
article/current/2012/10/11/104306/u.s.-quotas-
hinder-employment-visas. 
135. Bibhu Ranjan Mishra, “Uncle Sam Turns 
the Screws on Indian IT,” Business Standard, 
August 28, 2012, http://www.business-standard.
com/taketwo/news/uncle-sam-turnsscrews 
indian-it/484639/. 
136. Vialet, McClure, and Cerny, p. 34. 
137. Ibid., pp. 10, 23–24. 
138. Ibid., pp. 23–24. 
139. Cohen, pp. 113–15.
140. Ruth Ellen Wasem, “Immigration of Foreign 
Workers: Labor Market Tests and Protections,” 
Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2010, 
p. 16. 
141. Ibid., p. 18. 
142. Vialet, McClure, and Cerny, pp. 10, 28. 
143. Ibid., p. 11. 
144. Ilona Bray, U.S. Immigration Made Easy (Berke-
ley, CA: Nolo Publishing, 2011): 373–74.
145. Cohen., p. 100.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid., p. 101.
148. See Georgia Department of Agriculture, pp. 
100–117.
149. Helen Krieble, “The Red Card Solution: Bring-
ing Order to U.S. Border,” Vernon K. Krieble Foun-
dation, November 2010, pp. 27–28.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS FROM THE CATO INSTITUTE 
The Economic Case Against Arizona’s Immigration Laws by Alex Nowrasteh, Cato 
Institute Policy Analysis no. 709 (September 25, 2012)
Abolish the Department of Homeland Security by David Rittgers, Cato Institute 
Policy Analysis no. 683 (September 8, 2011)
Globalization: Curse or Cure? Policies to Harness Global Economic Integration to 
Solve Our Economic Challenge by Jagadeesh Gokhale, Cato Institute Policy Analysis 
no. 659 (February 1, 2010)
Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification: Franz Kafka’s Solution to Illegal 
Immigration by Jim Harper, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 612 (March 6, 2008)
Restriction or Legalization? Measuring the Economic Benefits of Immigration 
Reform by Peter B. Dixon and Maureen T. Rimmer, Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis 
no. 40 (August 13, 2009)
Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement without Legalization Cannot Stop Illegal 
Immigration by Douglas S. Massey, Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis no. 29 (June 
13, 2005)
Willing Workers: Fixing the Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration to the United 
States by Daniel Griswold, Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis no. 19 (October 15, 
2002)
As Immigrants Move In, Americans Move Up by Daniel Griswold, Cato Institute Free 
Trade Bulletin no. 38 (July 21, 2009)
The Fiscal Impact of Immigration Reform: The Real Story by Daniel Griswold, Cato 
Institute Free Trade Bulletin no. 30 (May 21, 2007)
Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Finally Getting It Right by Daniel Griswold, 
Cato Institute Free Trade Bulletin no. 29 (May 16, 2007)
Answering the Critics of Comprehensive Immigration Reform by Stuart Anderson, 
Cato Institute Trade Briefing Paper no. 32 (May 9, 2011)
The H-1B Straitjacket: Why Congress Should Repeal the Cap on Foreign-Born 
Highly Skilled Workers by Suzette Brooks Masters and Ted Ruthizer, Cato Institute 
Trade Briefing Paper no. 7 (March 3, 2000)
RECENT STUDIES IN THE  
CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES
718.  Should U.S. Fiscal Policy Address Slow Growth or the Debt? A 
Nondilemma by Jeffrey Miron (January 8, 2013)
717. China, America, and the Pivot to Asia by Justin Logan (January 8, 2013)
716.  A Rational Response to the Privacy “Crisis” by Larry Downes (January 7, 
2013)
715.  Humanity Unbound: How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and 
Nature from Humanity by Indur M. Goklany (December 20, 2012)
714.  On the Limits of Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or Abandon) 
Marijuana Bans by Robert A. Mikos (December 12, 2012)
713.  India and the United States: How Individuals and Corporations Have 
Driven Indo-U.S. Relations by Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar (December 11, 
2012)
712.  Stopping the Runaway Train: The Case for Privatizing Amtrak by Randal 
O’Toole (November 13, 2012)
711.  Grading the Government’s Data Publication Practices by Jim Harper 
(November 5, 2012)
710.  Countervailing Calamity: How to Stop the Global Subsidies Race by Scott 
Lincicome (October 9, 2012)
709.  The Economic Case against Arizona’s Immigration Laws by Alex Nowrasteh 
(September 25, 2012)
708.  Still a Protectionist Trade Remedy: The Case for Repealing Section 337 by K. 
William Watson (September 19, 2012)
707.  The Impact of Charter Schools on Public and Private School Enrollments 
by Richard Buddin (August 28, 2012)
706.  Economic Effects of Reductions in Defense Outlays by Benjamin Zycher 
(August 8, 2012)
705.  Libertarian Roots of the Tea Party by David Kirby and Emily Ekins (August 6, 
2012)
704.  Regulation, Market Structure, and Role of the Credit Rating Agencies by 
Emily McClintock Ekins and Mark A. Calabria (August 1, 2012)
703. Corporate Welfare in the Federal Budget by Tad DeHaven (July 25, 2012)
702.  Would a Financial Transaction Tax Affect Financial Market Activity? 
Insights from Futures Markets by George H. K. Wang and Jot Yau (July 9, 2012)
701.  The Negative Effects of Minimum Wage Laws by Mark Wilson (June 21, 2012)
700.  The Independent Payment Advisory Board: PPACA’s Anti-Constitutional 
and Authoritarian Super-Legislature by Diane Cohen and Michael F. Cannon 
(June 14, 2012)
699. The Great Streetcar Conspiracy by Randal O’Toole (June 14, 2012)
698.  Competition in Currency: The Potential for Private Money by Thomas L. 
Hogan (May 23, 2012)
697.  If You Love Something, Set It Free: A Case for Defunding Public 
Broadcasting by Trevor Burrus (May 21, 2012)
696.  Questioning Homeownership as a Public Policy Goal by Morris A. Davis (May 
15, 2012)
695.  Ending Congestion by Refinancing Highways by Randal O’Toole (May 15, 
2012)
694.  The American Welfare State: How We Spend Nearly $1 Trillion a Year 
Fighting Poverty—and Fail by Michael Tanner (April 11, 2012)
693.  What Made the Financial Crisis Systemic? by Patric H. Hendershott and Kevin 
Villani (March 6, 2012)
692.  Still a Better Deal: Private Investment vs. Social Security by Michael Tanner 
(February 13, 2012)
691.  Renewing Federalism by Reforming Article V: Defects in the Constitutional 
Amendment Process and a Reform Proposal by Michael B. Rappaport 
(January 18, 2012)
